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The recent upsurge in “brain training and perceptual-cognitive training,” proposing to improve isolated 
processes, such as brain function, visual perception, and decision-making, has created significant 
interest in elite sports practitioners, seeking to create an “edge” for athletes. The claims of these 
related “performance-enhancing industries” can be considered together as part of a process training 
approach proposing enhanced cognitive and perceptual skills and brain capacity to support 
performance in everyday life activities, including sport. For example, the “process training industry” 
promotes the idea that playing games not only makes you a better player but also makes you smarter, 
more alert, and a faster learner. In this position paper, we critically evaluate the effectiveness of both 
types of process training programmes in generalizing transfer to sport performance. These issues 
are addressed in three stages. First, we evaluate empirical evidence in support of perceptual-cognitive 
process training and its application to enhancing sport performance. Second, we critically review 
putative modularized mechanisms underpinning this kind of training, addressing limitations and 
subsequent problems. Specifically, we consider merits of this highly specific form of training, which 
focuses on training of isolated processes such as cognitive processes (attention, memory, thinking) 
and visual perception processes, separately from performance behaviors and actions. We conclude 
that these approaches may, at best, provide some “general transfer” of underlying processes to 
specific sport environments, but lack “specificity of transfer” to contextualize actual performance 
behaviors. A major weakness of process training methods is their focus on enhancing the performance 
in body “modules” (e.g., eye, brain, memory, anticipatory sub-systems). What is lacking is evidence 
on how these isolated components are modified and subsequently interact with other process 
“modules,” which are considered to underlie sport performance. Finally, we propose how an ecological 
dynamics approach, aligned with an embodied framework of cognition undermines the rationale that 
modularized processes can enhance performance in competitive sport. An ecological dynamics 
Renshaw et al. Brain-Training and Perception, Cognition and Action
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2468
INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent upsurge in the “process training industry,” 
proposing how to improve isolated processes such as perceptual 
and cognitive capacities, like vision, attention, creative thinking, 
memory, “ultra-fast” decision-making, in order to improve 
performance at work, in tests and examinations, and sport. In 
related vein, a “brain training industry” also promotes the idea 
that, for example, playing digital games not only makes you better 
at playing these games but also makes you smarter, more alert, 
and  helps you  to learn faster. Brain training software presents 
neuroscience research about neuroplasticity to support the 
efficiency of their programs in training brain processes which are 
claimed to underpin performance effectiveness in many specific 
performance domains, including sport. Taken together, the claims 
of the perceptual-cognitive training and brain enhancing programs 
can be addressed under the rubric of “process training” industries. 
Their claims have created significant interest in elite sports 
practitioners, seeking to enhance athletic performance and create 
an “edge” for athletes. Process training industries claim that they 
can develop core abilities that underpin perceptual and cognitive 
skills and brain function beyond a particular sport. But does 
process training really improve perceptual-cognitive abilities and 
brain processes in a way transferable to sport tasks performance? 
Can this kind of training be used as a shortcut to enhance sport 
performance? In this position paper, we show how an ecological 
dynamics rationale can undermine the significance of these 
industry claims, focusing on the weakness of the supportive 
evidence on specificity of transfer of training.
While practice is essential to improving sports performance, the 
search for the so-called one-percenters is commonly promoted by 
leading sport scientists and practitioners who are seeking to create 
an “edge” or “marginal gains” for elite athletes. To that end, athletes 
spend significant periods in “off-field” training activities to enhance 
perceptual skills such as improving their visual search for information, 
maintaining attentional focus, and improving memory through 
cognitive skills training to build “knowledge” in support of their 
on-field performance. There are commercial interests driving the 
industrial scale of the financial value and promotion of these training 
devices/programmes in sport. Systematic reviews, such as that of 
Harris et al. (2018) clearly point to the industry worth billions of 
dollars behind the use of a range of different “process training devices/
programmes” in sport. Their analysis shows that this “methodological 
approach” in sport has all the hallmark characteristics of an “industry.” 
Furthermore, these commercial interests are supported by the 
lucrative publication of popular science books, which have not 
necessarily been subject to rigorous peer review that academic 
literature has to undergo. Large swathes of the digital and conventional 
media provide broad support for the, sometimes, spurious claims of 
the process training industry (see Moreau et al., 2018).
Key questions for sport practitioners include: Is spending this 
amount of money justified? and What added value do these 
approaches purport to bring to performance? In this position paper, 
we address these questions and examine the evidence in support of 
these industry claims. We provide an ecological dynamics rationale 
to explain the limitations of the preferred modularized approach to 
training processes of perception and cognition and brain functions 
for understanding effects on sport performance. To address these 
issues, we first evaluate current approaches and evidence that support 
perceptual-cognitive training and its application in sport. We question 
the mechanisms purported to underpin process training and their 
limitations. A key focus is efficacy of theories of transfer, additive 
models, and evidence from neuroscience on brain plasticity (a key 
tenet for those advocating efficacy of “brain training”). In evaluating 
perceptual training effects, to exemplify our arguments, we provide 
an in-depth critical review of the evidence from the perspective of 
Quiet Eye, which could be  considered as part of vision training 
programmes. We conclude by presenting an ecological dynamics 
rationale that proposes a context-dependent perspective on the role 
of cognition, perception, and action, highlighting that the human 
performer is a complex adaptive system, which interacts with 
performance environments in a functionally integrated manner.
A commonality in training programs for brain and perceptual-
cognitive processes is that, currently, both industries tend to adopt 
a “modularized” approach. The assumption is that isolated 
processes (i.e., modules) in the brain and perceptual-cognitive 
functions can be trained separately from action in a performance 
context. Post-training, it is assumed that the enhanced process can 
be integrated back into the whole system with resultant performance 
duly enhanced. Indeed some proponents define CT as the act of 
improving what are termed “core cognitive processes,” which they 
assume to underlie sport performance (e.g., Walton et al., 2018). 
Substantial evidence for this claim is lacking, along with a rigorous 
definition of what is meant by the term “core cognitive processes.”
These assumptions in contemporary sport practice are based on 
the default approach of indirect perception underpinning sport 
psychologists’ attempts to describe and develop specific processes, 
such as perception, anticipation, attention, memory, and decision-
making, by exposing performers to selectively adapt and modify 
displays such as still images, short video clips, and snapshots 
of performance environments (Araújo et al., 2017). This methodology 
is exemplified by schematic presentations of the position of chess 
pieces on a board (Chase and Simon, 1973), the co-positioning of 
players in two basketball teams or the serve actions of tennis players 
hitting topspin, slice, or flat serves (for a review, see Williams et al., 
1999; Starkes et  al., 2001). It does not seem to be  considered 
perspective proposes that the body is a complex adaptive system, interacting with 
performance environments in a functionally integrated manner, emphasizing that the inter-
relation between motor processes, cognitive and perceptual functions, and the constraints 
of a sport task is best understood at the performer-environment scale of analysis.
Keywords: perceptual-cognitive training, brain training, motor learning, neuroplasticity, ecological dynamics, 
sport performance
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important that an “action response” might constitute a button press 
in the studies evaluated (Walton et al., 2018). The assumption seems 
to be that any response will suffice to test effects of cognitive training 
on behavior, and it is unsurprising that a major outcome of current 
evaluations is a call for further investigation.
The assumptions underpinning the default approach in the 
literature supporting process training are not supported by other 
theoretical rationales, such as that of ecological dynamics (Araújo 
et al., 2017). In contrast, the ecological dynamics approach considers 
perceptual, cognition, and action sub-systems to be  deeply 
intertwined in their activity, functioning as continuously integrated 
and highly coupled systems. Theoretically, it is not coherent and of 
little value to use a modularized approach and decouple processes 
of perception, cognition, and action to train them in isolation. 
Further, ecological dynamics is deeply concerned with knowledge 
and considers intentions and cognition to play an important role 
in theoretical explanations of human behavior (Davids et  al., 
2001a,b; Davids and Araújo, 2010a; Araújo et al., 2017). Determining 
how effective the indirect methods of developing underlying 
mechanisms of sports expertise is the key issue addressed in this 
paper. How can we enhance the cognition, perceptions, and actions 
through indirect means to support skilled performance that emerges 
through direct learning for athletes to become perceptually attuned 
to relevant properties of the environment? Here, we propose that 
effective interventions can be achieved by basing learning design 
on a view of knowledge, cognition, and intentions as deeply 
integrated and intertwined. Intentions, perception, and action 
interact to mutually constrain performance in practice and 
competition, and this key point needs to underpin the design of 
performance enrichment programs which target PC processes.
Training programs, based on indirect methods to build 
“knowledge about” the environment, enhance knowledge that can 
be  used to describe (verbally or pictorially) performance. In 
contrast, the more direct “knowledge of ” the environment (see 
Araújo et al., 2009; Araújo and Davids, 2011) supports how an 
individual interacts with a performance environment, intentionally, 
perceptually, and motorically, in picking up and utilizing affordances 
from the performance environment (defined as opportunities for 
action in ecological psychology). Gibson (1966, 1979) has suggested 
that knowledge of the environment is expressed by action and 
implies direct perception (i.e., the environment informs about what 
it is without the need of a mental—indirect—attribution of 
meaning) and direct experiences with specific environments. 
Adaptive behavior emerges as a continuous cycle where performers 
can prospectively control their actions by detecting information 
(Araújo et  al., 2018). Consequently, ecological psychologists 
suggest that direct learning (Jacobs and Michaels, 2007) to develop 
“knowledge of ” the environment is achieved by “doing.” Direct 
epistemological contact with an environment facilitates knowing 
how to achieve a task goal because it involves learning to detect 
and attune to key perceptual variables that regulate performance 
behaviors. Direct perception differs from indirect perception in its 
insistence of the mental integration of action, cognition, and 
perception through active performance to underpin human 
behavior. Ecological psychologists agree that knowledge could 
be obtained via mediated or indirect perception (Gibson, 1979) as 
a way of developing knowledge “second hand.” Essentially, the 
indirect acquisition of knowledge about the environment via a 
passive “classroom” approach, advocated and adopted in many 
contemporary approaches to sport psychology, is aligned with 
historical accounts of learning per se (i.e., formal discipline theory). 
Indirect knowledge about the environment involves shared 
knowledge about a performance environment mediated by 
language, symbols, pictures, displays, and verbal instructions 
(Araújo and Davids, 2011). The role of indirect forms of knowledge 
is to direct awareness and previous experiences for channeling a 
future “direct” experience with a specific environment (Reed, 
1991). Here, we argue that, if enrichment programs are going to 
succeed in enhancing sport performance, they need to be predicated 
on the deeply intertwined relations between cognition (in the form 
of knowledge of the environment), actions, and perception, to pick 
up and utilize affordances during learning and performance.
These ideas are somewhat aligned with those in an embodied 
framework of cognition (e.g., Moreau et al., 2015) outlining the 
inter-relations between motor and cognitive processes, emphasizing 
that motor (cognitive) system involvement depends on specific 
cognitive (motor) interactions with a performance environment.
Some Questions Over the Methods of the 
Process Training Industry
The recent upsurge in brain training programmes via computer 
“testing” has led to a multi-million GB pound industry (Owen 
et al., 2010), with proponents claiming improvements across the 
board in terms of cognitive functions for older people, preschoolers, 
and for those who play videogames, over those that do not. Brain 
training is appealing for consumers as it can be used outside of 
formal education and skill learning programmes, potentially 
marketing continuing cognitive development to a wider population. 
Despite the popularity, there remain some key questions that need 
to be addressed in future research.
What Are the Supportive Theory-Practice Links to 
Sustain General Ideas of Process Training?
Traditionally, perceptual-cognitive skills have been defined as the 
ability to identify and process environmental information, and 
integrate them with pre-existing knowledge and motor capabilities, 
to select and execute adequate actions (e.g., Marteniuk, 1976). In 
the 1960s and 1970s, there was an enormous amount of 
experimentation on “preprogramming” movements, muscle 
commands, the structure of motor programmes, central 
representations, attention and conscious control, movement 
execution in the absence of feedback, and invariant properties of 
abstract representations stored somewhere in the brain. This 
research led to disparate views of motor programmes in the 
literature, from an abstract, symbolic representation to a grouping 
of neuronal cells functioning in the vertebrate motor system The 
notion that skilled performance can be enhanced by storing motor 
programmes in the brain has had considerable influence on 
approaches to performance analysis and training in the sports 
sciences. For example, more recently, Summers and Anson (2009) 
revisited the notion of a motor programme, proposing that it was 
one of the most robust and durable phenomena in the motor 
control literature. An implicit assumption has been that skilled 
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performance in sport is characterized by motor system invariance. 
This notion has led sports biomechanists to pursue the identification 
of an “ideal” movement template considered as a criterion of expert 
performance and acquired through numerous trial repetitions (e.g., 
Brisson and Alain, 1996). The implication is that motor programmes 
can be internalized in central nervous system structures of athletes 
with specific practice of a target movement assumed to be optimal 
with respect to time and learning (Gentile, 1972; Schöllhorn et al., 
2006). Motor programmes reflect a traditional bias in psychology 
towards seeking personal attributions in explanations of human 
behavior and the neglect of situational attributions. This inherent 
bias in traditional psychology is exemplified by an overemphasis 
on the acquisition of enriched internal states in the brain (predicated 
on perceptual and cognitive skills) for explaining behavior 
regulation (Dunwoody, 2006; see also Davids and Araújo, 2010a,b; 
Araújo and Davids, 2011). The concept of organismic asymmetry 
refers to a predisposition to attribute behavior regulation solely to 
personal characteristics internalized in the brain by individuals 
through learning and practice, underplaying the role of the 
environment in transactions to support behavioral adaptation. 
Organismic asymmetry in traditional psychological theories 
reflects a preference for internal mechanisms, such as mental 
representations, to explain how the processes of perception, action, 
and cognition may be regulated. Dunwoody (2006) has expanded 
upon Brunswik’s (1955) criticisms of cognitive psychology 
explanations of behavior being biased away from person-
environment interactions, as the basis of an “organismic asymmetry.” 
These theoretical biases and assumptions are harmonious with 
goals and aims of process training programmes based on learning 
to acquire a complex integrated representation of a movement in 
achieving expert performance in sport (Schmidt and Wrisberg, 
2008).
Furthermore, some psychological theories have argued that it is 
the underlying cognitive control structures supporting performance 
that distinguish highly skilled individuals from their less-skilled 
counterparts (Abernethy et al., 2007). There is relevant research on 
the possible effectiveness of cognitive training in sport (Brown and 
Fletcher, 2017), specifically in interventions focusing on training 
perceptual-cognitive (P-C) skills such as pattern recognition, 
anticipation, decision-making, and quiet-eye (Farrow, 2013). 
Perceptual training programmes have been suggested as an additional 
aid to enhance performance preparation across all skill levels but are 
considered particularly useful for elite level performers who are time 
poor and have to conserve physical (energy) resources (Farrow, 2013) 
or avoid problems of overtraining and potential overuse injuries. 
However, while elite sports organizations may justify adopting such 
methods, it is somewhat surprising that few studies have examined 
the efficacy of such training programmes (Farrow, 2013). The same 
fundamental question underlies all process training programmes 
(i.e., the same concerns arise over general training programmes for 
enhancing brain processes and developing generic cognitive abilities): 
Do these programmes really improve cognitive abilities, perceptual 
skills, and/or brain processes in a way that is transferable to sport 
performance? Can this kind of training be used as a shortcut to 
enhance sport performance or are their perceived effects illusory?
Unsurprisingly, the majority of P-C training programmes have 
adopted similar methods to those used by researchers in measuring 
expertise, methods which have evolved in concert with emergent 
technologies. A clear tendency has been to use sports-specific 
content as a central feature of such training, as opposed to 
generalized training approaches, deemed as being ineffective 
(Abernethy and Wood, 2001). For example, early studies of 
expertise used static images of typical performance situations to 
examine cognitive and perceptual abilities of athletes, such as 
pattern recognition and recall skills (e.g., Chase and Simon, 1973; 
Allard and Starkes, 1980). Some researchers began to use temporal 
and spatial occlusion methods by requiring performers to watch 
dynamic video clips of “actions” of cricket bowlers, basketballers, 
footballers, squash, or badminton players, for example, in seeking 
to identify the information that novices and experts use to guide 
processes such as anticipation and decision-making. Many of these 
studies have recently been viewed as having a number of significant 
limitations including the use of small 2D screens, making 
information difficult to interpret; a lack of first person perspectives; 
and a putative “correct answer” associated with verbal or written 
responses instead of sport actions (van der Kamp et al., 2008).
How Strong Is Evidence for Some Claims of the Brain 
Training Industry?
Despite a large number of publications reporting tests of the effects 
of brain training interventions, evidence that training with 
commercial brain training software can enhance cognition, outside 
the laboratory tests is limited and inconsistent for performance in 
general (Simons et al., 2016) as well as in sport (Walton et al., 2018). 
For example, Owen et al. (2010) reported data from a six-week 
study in which 11,430 participants were trained online on cognitive 
tasks focusing on improving reasoning, memory, planning, 
visuospatial skills, and attention. Improvements were only 
registered in the cognitive tasks that were trained online. There 
was no evidence for transfer effects to untrained related tasks, even 
those considered to be  “cognitively” closely related. Overall, it 
seems that practicing a cognitive task in brain training programs 
results in consistent improvements in performance on that 
particular task (near transfer). The available evidence that such 
training generalizes to other related tasks or to nondigital, ecological 
performance (far transfer) is not compelling (Simons et al., 2016).
Evidence on the limitations of brain training may not come as 
a surprise, given the plethora of research that has examined the 
underlying psychological processes underpinning expert sport 
performance, which involves a simultaneous participation of motor 
and cognitive processes (Williams and Ericsson, 2005).
What Does the Perceptual-Cognitive Training  
Industry Claim?
A systematic review by Harris et  al. (2018) located 43 studies 
purporting to examine the beneficial effects of use of Commercial 
Cognitive Training devices on sport performance. Their search 
yielded only a single study that examined the most important issue 
of transfer effects to sport performance. Unsurprisingly, they 
concluded that there was limited evidence for transfer effects to sport 
performance. They attributed the lack of support for beneficial effects 
of perceptual-cognitive training to the current lack of studies seeking 
to provide evidence for these effects. There are two problems with 
this conclusion. First, it does not take into account that there may 
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be many studies of perceptual-cognitive process training, which have 
not been submitted for publication because researchers did not find 
the expected benefits. This is a limitation that quantitative reviews 
always need to acknowledge, known as publication bias. Second, it 
is possible that the lack of beneficial effects may have been 
compounded by a lack of a substantive theoretical rationale 
implemented in research designs for how process training may yield 
benefits to performers. This is a weakness of contemporary research 
that we seek to address via this position statement.
What Can the Process Training Industry Learn From 
Research Seeking to Integrate Perception and Action 
in Sport Performance?
A key criticism of process training methods is that they do not 
allow participants to access both the dorsal and ventral visual 
cortical systems used in actual performances (van der Kamp et al., 
2008). Developing technologies have enabled researchers more 
recently to undertake “in situ” studies of perception and action by 
using equipment like liquid occlusion goggles to enable more 
representative perception-action couplings to emerge during 
performance of a sport action. Ensuing data has revealed that 
requiring performers to utilize action-regulating perceptual 
information and demonstrate greater fidelity in perception-action 
responses may be  more effective in highlighting expertise 
differences between athletes (e.g., Mann et  al., 2010). Similar 
findings have been reported in eye tracking studies to assess visual 
search strategies. For example, goalkeepers were shown to alter 
their visual search patterns with respect to a “stimulus” presented 
and the action response required (Dicks et al., 2010; Dicks et al., 
2017; Navia et al., 2017). Interestingly, the study by Dicks et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that the initiation of an action response by 
football goalkeepers facing penalties was mediated by their action 
capabilities. Goalkeepers who could dive “faster” were able to 
sample more of the penalty taker’s unfolding kick than those who 
moved more slowly. Pinder et  al. (2011a,b) found that video 
training involving simulated cricket batting against a video-
projected bowler on a “life-size” screen was partially representative 
of the fidelity of batting actions used against an actual bowler. 
When batting against the projected image, batters coupled the 
backswing of the bat and initial step, when preparing to get into 
position to hit the ball. However, the initiation of the downswing 
and swing velocity was different under the two conditions.
To enhance a tight coupling of perception and action systems 
during training in cricket, an ecological dynamics rationale 
proposes that batters need to couple the act of swinging a bat to 
hit a ball during actual flight, not an indirect image of a ball in 
flight simulated on a 2-dimensional video screen. The key issue 
is that the relevant affordances used by batters under the two 
conditions are different and quite specific. The implication is that 
extended practice in both different practice conditions is likely to 
lead to learners becoming more successful in batting under those 
specific conditions. The important question for cricket coaches 
(and of course skill acquisition theorists who advise them on 
learning design) is as follows: Which practice simulation is more 
closely related to the affordances available in cricket batting 
performance? To develop effective perception-action couplings 
in a time-efficient manner, the theoretical implication is that 
batters need to face real bowlers in practice, which would allow 
the batters to pick up and use affordances from the bowlers’ actions 
in delivering the ball (and earlier). To address issues faced by 
limited video training or use of ball projection machines, where 
no advanced information is available from opponents such as 
baseball pitchers or cricket bowlers, technologies such as 
ProBatterTM have emerged, which seek to strengthen the links 
between perception and action. This has the potential to be a useful 
compromise, based on a powerful theoretical rationale in 
ecological dynamics, linking video images of a bowler’s actions 
with a ball projection machine. However, challenges emerge for 
participants when perceptual information provided in a video 
image is not representative of that provided by a bowler. In cricket 
bowling, bowlers change their bowling actions or their grips on 
the ball to deceive batters, imparting different spins, or to create 
swerve in ball flight. At present, projected ball flight with such 
technology does not reflect these important variations in flight. 
What you  see is what you  do not get. Additionally, the ball is 
projected through one hole and a batter can quickly become 
attuned to the information from the projection machine and learn 
to simply watch the projection hole only. Additionally, this fixed 
release point also limits the ability of the batter to determine the 
bounce point of the ball as a function of the angle of the bowler’s 
arm at ball release. The impact of practicing with these technological 
limitations on skill performance was demonstrated in a recent 
investigation combining video technology and a ball projection 
machine. Catching performance was negatively impacted with 
even a minor de-synchronization of perceptual images presented 
and flight characteristics of a ball projected by a machine (Stone 
et al., 2014).
Data such as these have important implications for those 
interested in designing and implementing perceptual training 
programmes. The evidence over the last 15 years from numerous 
reviews (e.g., Williams and Ward, 2007; Causer et  al., 2012; 
Travassos et  al., 2013; Vine et  al., 2014; Broadbent et  al., 2015; 
Slimani et  al., 2016) is clear on the usefulness of P-C training. 
However, there is a major problem to be  resolved. While P-C 
programmes “provide an idealized method for developing 
anticipation and decision-making judgments in athletes” 
(Broadbent et al., 2015, p. 329), the degree to which they transfer 
to competitive performance needs much more work. That is, 
transfer tests to competitive performance in sport settings are 
highly important and need to be  implemented more frequently 
than they currently are in existing research (see also Harris et al., 
2018). Overall, the current evidence is that P-C training effects 
remain specific to the confines of the training context: participants 
seem to improve at the training task. However, their effectiveness 
when transferred to sport performance is strongly mediated by the 
degree to which the training environment is representative of a 
performance environment and the fidelity of the actions required 
as a response (Travassos et al., 2013). To that end, a number of 
researchers have called for a more systematic programme of 
research to examine the nature and content of perceptual training 
approaches and their relationship with the skill of the user/learner 
(Farrow, 2013). Similarly, others have highlighted the need for such 
studies to be based on a strong theoretical framework that captures 
the complexity of cognition, perception, and action in sport 
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performance and the nature of transfer from practice to performance 
(Seifert et al., 2013; Chow et al., in press).
Can We Be Sure That Research Findings on Use of 
P-C Skills Observed in Skilled Sport Performers Are 
Relevant for Training of Sub-elite Individuals?
One of the limitations of perceptual training programmes is that 
they often adopt a “one-size-fits all” approach in implying that 
the information used to anticipate and act in research studies is 
thought to be commonly used by all sport performers, regardless 
of skill level (Farrow, 2013). A good example where this approach 
has been adopted is in the research on Quiet Eye, which has 
recently seen a significant level of interest from researchers 
interested in P-C training but is now also attracting significant 
criticisms. The Quiet Eye (QE) phenomenon provides insights 
into gaze behaviors and their utility for decision-making and 
action in sport contexts (e.g., Vickers, 1996). QE, a consistent 
perceptual-cognitive measure investigated in sports research (cf. 
Mann et al., 2007; Baker and Wattie, 2016), is defined as the final 
fixation towards a specific location or object within 3* of visual 
angle or less for a minimum of 100 ms (Vickers, 2016) and has 
been described as process training (Wilson and Vine, 2018). The 
onset of QE occurs just before the critical movement of the action, 
while the offset occurs when the final fixation deviates from the 
located target for more than 100 ms (Panchuk and Vickers, 2006; 
Vickers, 2016). QE is proposed as one of the key determining 
factors associated with expert decision-making in sport, declared 
as the “perception-action variable” (Vickers, 2007; Causer et al., 
2011). Rienhoff et al. (2016) meta-analysis located 581 published 
papers on QE research, evident of a significant amount of research 
activity over the years, which is almost exclusively situated within 
a linear cause-and-effect methodological landscape, based within 
a program dedicated to identifying a sole point of engagement 
with information within the perceptual field, typical of traditional 
decision-making studies (Glimcher, 2005; Chemero and Heyser, 
2009). Further, it remains unclear why research on QE has been 
dominated by assumptions and terminology associated with an 
information-processing perspective towards cognition in sports 
performers (Michaels and Beek, 1995; Rienhoff et  al., 2016). 
Regardless of this theoretical imbalance, some studies have 
utilized QE as a tool for perceptual training in sport. For example, 
QE training interventions have been used in attempts to train 
visual search strategies of nonexperts in similar tasks performed 
by expert counterparts. For example, Harle and Vickers (2001) 
study demonstrated the potential of QE-based training 
interventions, with significant improvements reported during 
free throw simulations, and notable fidelity of transfer into games 
(see also Causer et al., 2011).
While on the face of it, these data imply relevance of QE values 
which are universal for sport performers regardless of skill level, 
there have been numerous concerns raised over the legitimacy 
of QE training interventions. As Causer (2016, p2.) suggested in 
his commentary to Vickers (2016), “there are limited acquisition 
trials, short retention periods and multiple training interventions.” 
It is clear from the literature that the design of training 
interventions and research methods associated with them has 
been underdeveloped. For example, often trials are isolated 
incidents of performance, with the tasks being nonrepresentative 
of the constraints that exist in performance settings (Rienhoff 
et  al., 2016). The lack of representative design is even more 
concerning when addressing dynamic team sports where there 
are numerous evolving landscapes governed by spatial and 
temporal constraints. The generalizability of findings in such 
studies to expert performance is currently limited. Additionally, 
while it may be  argued that there may exist some task- and 
expertise-dependent features of QE, the central premise of QE 
training is the search for a putative optimal behavior, with QE 
times typically being averaged out across trials and participants 
(Dicks et  al., 2017a). However, evidence is emerging that 
variability in gaze patterns in learning and performance are task- 
and individual-specific as are many movement behaviors. This 
observation highlights the fallacy of attempting to replicate a 
universal optimal gaze pattern to sit alongside optimal universal 
movement patterns (Dicks et al., 2017a).
In summary, research has shown inconclusive results for effects 
of brain training (Simons et al., 2016; Mirifar et al., 2017) and P-C 
training programmes and many questions remain. Nevertheless, 
more important to the understanding of sport performance, this 
process-oriented research has neglected the role of the body and 
environment in performance (Ring et al., 2015). The analysis of 
many P-C interventions, including QE training programmes, 
suffers the same methodological issues inherent in brain training 
studies: no pre-test baseline, no control group, lack of random 
assignment, passive control group, small samples, and lack of 
blinding when using subjective outcome measures (Simons et al., 
2016; Walton et al., 2018). While these methodological weaknesses 
may be more apparent in brain training studies compared to P-C 
research, published evidence rarely shows zero effects of training 
interventions (null hypothesis is supported), implying universal 
benefits of these process training programmes. Further research 
is needed to understand whether the apparently universally 
successful outcomes of process training studies may actually 
be more indicative of Psychology’s problem with replication and 
publication bias more generally.
In order to consider how we  can best develop P-C skills in 
performers, we  need to undertake a critical review of the 
mechanisms and theory underpinning the current approaches 
used. We undertake this task next with a focus on Additive Models, 
the role of transfer, and the evaluation of the neuroscience 
underpinning P-C programmes.
ADDITIVE MODELS OF LEARNING
To examine efficacy of cognitive training programmes, such as 
generic computer-based brain training programmes or perceptual 
training programmes, we  need to consider the rationale or 
theoretical beliefs about learning behind such approaches and then 
consider the empirical evidence. The basic assumption of this 
neurocomputational approach is that brain functions process input 
information and produce behavioral outputs like a computer 
(Anson et  al., 2005). This approach favors the acquisition of 
knowledge indirectly through the enrichment of representations 
of the world in the brain. Therefore, a common approach adopted 
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by applied sport psychologists is to provide knowledge about 
performance in the classroom or laboratory, before later (hopefully) 
applying it (Andersen, 2000; Weinberg and Gould, 2011). This 
approach is implicitly based on ideas from formal discipline theory, 
which has been the basis of education systems for centuries (Simons 
et al., 2016). This theory suggests that the mind consists of capacities 
(e.g., concentration, reasoning ability, memory) that can 
be  improved through exercise, with the brain being just like a 
muscle that can be trained (Barnett and Ceci, 2002; Taatgen, 2013; 
Simons et  al., 2016). Hence, each capacity can be  developed 
generally, and in isolation from action in a performance 
environment, before being applied or transferred into practice in 
step-like sequences (Taatgen, 2013).
Despite empirical evidence suggesting that the development 
of a more generic knowledge base is limited, the additive, modular, 
step-like approach to learning key cognitive capacities supporting 
performance is strongly embedded in applied sport psychology. 
For example, Williams (1986; 2010) proposed a four-step model 
of integrating sport psychology techniques such as goal setting 
or relaxation into performance. Similar programmes were 
promoted by sport psychologists working for the National 
Coaching Foundation in the UK in the early 1980s. For example, 
it was believed that athletes could improve their concentration 
by utilizing “concentration grids” where they could find 
and cross off numbers 1–100 in a 10 × 10 numbered square (see 
https://cgridid.com/2017/04/03/concentration-grid-for-coaches-
and-sports-psychologyperformance-professionals/ for a contem-
porary version) or learn progressive muscular relaxation 
techniques via an audiotape.
Despite recent potential advances in theoretical approaches to 
develop a more connected approach to movement analysis with 
“parts” being seen as more connected than in a traditional motor 
programming model (e.g. Hossner et  al., 2015), in reality, the 
additive model is still strongly represented in practice design, for 
example, in the common part-whole approach to learning. In this 
approach, practitioners break a task down into its subcomponents 
to reputedly make learning easier. Decomposing a task into parts 
is purported to help develop greater performance consistency and 
stability (Handford, 2006). A proposed theoretical premise of this 
approach is motor programming (e.g. Schmidt, 1975), which, 
despite the emergence of contemporary neural computation 
theories of brain and behavior remains a prevailing theoretical 
model in motor control and learning (e.g., Shea and Wulf, 2005; 
Schmidt and Wrisberg, 2008; Summers and Anson, 2009). Hence, 
advocates of such approaches suggest that tasks composed of 
serially organized motor programmes are best suited to part-whole 
learning (Schmidt and Young, 1986). For example, tennis serving 
is proposed as a task where there is “clear evidence that practicing 
the subtasks in isolation can transfer to the total task” (Seymour, 
1954 cited by Schmidt and Young, 1986, p. 23). Apparently, this is 
not surprising as the subtasks are essentially independent activities 
with little difference when performing them apart or whole. 
Accordingly, tennis serving is made up of two separate motor 
programmes (i.e., the ball-toss backswing as the first programme 
and the programme which produces the hit) that run sequentially 
(Schmidt and Young, 1986). However, there is limited neuroscientific 
evidence in support of this explanation, with empirical research 
questioning the efficacy of additive approaches in skill acquisition. 
A number of studies have shown that breaking actions down to 
improve modules or subphases does not lead to transfer when 
performing the whole task. For example, in tasks such as tennis or 
volleyball serving, coaching manuals have followed the model of 
part-whole learning emphasizing that a consistent ball toss is 
crucial to the success of the serve (Davids et al., 2001a). Coaching 
practice, therefore, focuses on developing a stereotyped toss action 
in isolation from the “hit.” Commonly, coaches put a small hoop 
or draw a chalk circle on the court surface and require players to 
throw the ball up to land inside the hoop. Only when consistency 
is achieved do coaches “add in” the hitting component. However, 
evidence shows that even expert tennis and volleyball players do 
not actually achieve invariant positioning in the vertical, forward-
back, and side-to-side toss of the ball. Handford (2006) observed 
senior international volleyball players and found that the only 
invariant feature of their serves was the vertical component of the 
toss, with the forward-back and side-to-side dimension showing 
high levels of variability. It seems that servers aim to create temporal 
stability between the time of peak height of the ball toss and the 
time required for the forward swing of the hand to contact the ball. 
In a study to compare ball toss characteristics in part and whole 
tasks, the variability of the peak height of ball toss, when undertaking 
part practice, and the mean value for peak height was much greater 
than when the whole task was performed (Handford, 2006). 
Decomposing the task led to movement patterns that were 
dysfunctional for performance, and the key to skill acquisition was 
to learn to couple perception and action (interrupted by part 
training methodology). Other evidence questioning the usefulness 
of decomposing complex motor skills into smaller parts in actions 
that require individuals to couple their movements to the 
environment to achieve task goals exists in research on locomotor 
pointing tasks such as long jumping or cricket bowling. A nested 
task attached to the end of a run-up like jumping, or throwing an 
implement or ball, emphasizes the importance of the run-up to 
achieve a functional position to successfully complete the added 
task. Unfortunately, this emphasis has led to some coaches focusing 
on developing a stereotyped run-up. For example, in the long jump, 
athletes are asked to practice “run-throughs” without the need for 
jumping. However, empirical evidence has highlighted differences 
in gait regulation strategies when there is a requirement to jump 
rather than simply run through the pit (Glize and Laurent, 1997). 
Motor programming models of skill performance have had a 
significant impact on coaching of run-ups. For example, the belief 
that run-ups can be simply “run-off ” with no need to engage with 
the environment is seen in the advice of former fast-bowling great 
and coaching guru, Dennis Lillee (Lillee and Brayshaw, 1977). Lillee 
suggests that the bowler who is having no-ball problems should 
simply put down a marker on the outfield, close his (or her) eyes, 
and run-up to “bowl” and mark the point at which the ball is 
delivered. After a few trials, the bowler will “know” the ideal run-up 
length, which should be measured and transferred to the game. 
Consequently, it is now common to observe cricket bowlers 
calibrate their run-ups with a tape measure. However, empirical 
evidence again rejects the idea of stereotyping of foot placement, 
reporting refined adaptations of gait, regulated by informational 
constraints of the environment, most commonly picked up by 
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vision (de Rugy et al., 2002). In fact, continuous perception-action 
coupling during human locomotor pointing (i.e., running to place 
a foot on a target) has been demonstrated by athletes who make 
adjustments to their foot positioning as and when needed 
throughout the entire run-up (Renshaw and Davids, 2004). 
Continuous gait adjustments were found to be based on perception 
of the athletes’ current versus requisite positioning of the foot in 
relation to a target (Renshaw and Davids, 2004). Some expert 
coaches are aware of this concept and have noted that the ability 
to perceive the difference between current and ideal footfall 
positioning evolves through practice and experience and is part of 
the skill set of elite athletes (Greenwood et al., 2012).
In summary, evidence in support of additive models is somewhat 
flawed, and even studies of what might be  viewed as highly 
“repeatable techniques,” such as running (Kiely, 2017), have 
highlighted that even when expert runners run at steady paces, 
movement patterns continuously vary. In fact, a key property of 
human movement systems, degeneracy (i.e., the emergent 
organization of the movement system in many different ways to 
achieve the same outcome), promotes efficiency and robustness in 
performance. When systems display increased stability and reduced 
complexity, for example, due to wear and tear due to chronic injury, 
misuse, or disuse, it can lead to performance decrements and 
further injuries (Kiely, 2017).
TRANSFER
In elite sport, where time is precious, planned activities need to 
be empirically supported by evidence. An essential question for 
sport psychologists working with sports organizations is Do 
indirect methods of learning transfer to actual task performance? 
Practitioners and sport psychologists need to have confidence that 
prior experiences will prepare participants for novel situations and 
that practicing one task will improve performance of a related task. 
The rest of this paper will focus on the question of how much trust 
can be  placed on perceptual-cognitive research and training 
activities undertaken via computer training or in laboratories or 
classrooms. How effective are these methods in contributing to 
improve cognition, perception, and action in performance settings? 
Here, we focus on the key issue: transfer.
The concept of transfer is central to the discussion of effectiveness 
of perceptual-cognitive training programmes in enhancing sport 
performance. Transfer of learning has been defined as “the gain 
(or loss) in the capability for responding in one task (termed the 
criterion task) as a function of practice or experience in some other 
task(s)” (Schmidt and Young, 1986, p. 2). Despite the prevalence 
of ideas from formal discipline theory in contemporary sport 
psychology, opposition to these ideas was initially raised by 
Thorndike (1922). Thorndike proposed the identical elements 
theory of transfer which argued that to transfer, elements of the 
practice task must be tightly coupled to the properties (stimuli, 
tasks and responses) in the performance task (Simons et al., 2016). 
Hence, only tasks with near transfer (i.e., those tasks which share 
common features) are likely to result in effective transfer, while far 
transfer (i.e., tasks/domains with significantly different common 
elements) is less likely to be effective. More recent models of skills 
acquisition have attempted to overcome the problems of explaining 
far transfer as per Thorndike’s theory by proposing models of skill 
acquisition such as the ACT production system (Newell, 1980; 
Anderson, 1982). Production models suggest that an initial stage 
of skill learning is characterized by the development of a declarative 
knowledge base (where a person initially learns only the “facts” 
about the skill), which is converted into procedural knowledge 
(Anderson, 1982). The procedural knowledge (or production 
phase) uses the declarative knowledge interpretively, with an initial 
composition of elements that takes sequential elements and 
collapses them into single complex production units (i.e., chunking-
Chase and Simon, 1973). The procedural phase involves application 
of knowledge learned, meaning that nondomain-specific knowledge 
can be  applied to perform in a specific domain, supporting 
behaviors appropriate to that domain (Anderson, 1982). While the 
ACT model was updated with proposed neuroscientific support 
in 2004 (Anderson et al., 2004), to our knowledge there has yet to 
be  a sustained attempt to integrate the model into a practice 
programme in sport for training brain or P-C processes. It is 
apparent that, in production models, knowledge necessary for a 
particular task is encoded in a set of internalized rules in a 
“condition-action” paradigm (Taatgen, 2013). The result is that 
production models seek to explain how far transfer may occur by 
suggesting that the declarative knowledge base acts as the main 
source of transfer (Taatgen, 2013), suggesting the efficacy of 
domain-general cognitive abilities (Sala and Gobet, 2017).
But, a key issue is how to separate specific elements from general 
items in order to maximize transfer (Taatgen, 2013). What 
components are “near” and “far” in this model of transfer? There are 
other limitations in production models for explaining transfer, for 
example, What is the starting point of knowledge? Cognitive models 
therefore suffer from the problem of prior knowledge in some form 
(Taatgen, 2013). Finally, enhancement should not be mistaken with 
transfer (Moreau and Conway, 2014); enhancement is demonstrated 
when an experimental condition shows significant improvement in 
any kind of measurement task relative to the control condition; this 
is not the same as responding in one task (sport) as a function of 
practice in some other task (brain training task).
In summary, there is significant empirical evidence that 
practice only generally improves performance for a practiced task, 
or nearly identical ones, and does not greatly enhance other 
related skills. Generic noncontextual interventions may have 
limited value (Simons et al., 2016). The current view on transfer 
can be considered in terms of a continuum spectrum; the bigger 
the similarity between tasks, the bigger the transfer (Barnett and 
Ceci, 2002).
EVIDENCE FROM NEUROSCIENCE 
RELEVANT TO PROCESS TRAINING
Given the arguments on transfer, it is clear that brain training 
programmes typically focus on performance during relatively 
general tasks (promoting at best far or general transfer). In line 
with the general discipline theory of learning, advocates for brain 
training claim that learning these skills by, for example, playing 
computer-based games will make them “smarter, more alert, and 
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able to learn faster and better” (Lindenberger et al., 2017). That 
is, they will lead to the development of a more general range of 
skills in a wide range of contexts. However, while evidence is 
lacking for these claims (e.g., Sala et  al., 2017), advocates for 
cognitive training programmes have turned to the science of 
neural plasticity to support their claims (Simons et al., 2016). 
Understanding how brain training might work requires a 
compelling theoretical rationale for explaining how and why 
processes in brain development and, in particular, the role of 
brain plasticity in adaptive learning. Without a comprehensive 
explanation one is left with an operational description of brain 
processes as modular which are assumed to be  trainable in 
isolation. So what does the science actually tell us? Plasticity is 
defined as “the brain’s capacity to respond to experiences with 
structural changes that alter the behavioral repertoire” 
(Lindenberger et al., 2017, p. 261). It is a key feature of learning, 
remembering, and adapting to changing conditions of the body 
and the environment (Power and Schlaggar, 2017). When 
learning a new skill, studies of brain development have 
demonstrated that the mechanisms of plasticity can be modeled 
as a two-phase process, with an overproduction phase preceding 
a pruning phase (Lindenberger et al., 2017). The increase in the 
number of synapses at the beginning of the plastic episode 
corresponds with an initial exploration phase as the learner 
searches for a functional task solution (Chow et al., 2015). Once 
found, stabilization occurs, with connections that “work” being 
selected and nonfunctional neural patterns decaying. 
Consequently, changes in brain gray matter volume are specific 
to the experiences undertaken with the brain exhibiting “dramatic, 
larger scale changes in organization in response to experience” 
(Power and Schlaggar, 2017, p.  4). This point has important 
implications for learning and practice design highlighting the 
need for careful thought to promote functional neural 
organization. For example, neuroimaging of musicians who play 
stringed instruments revealed larger than normal sensory 
activation in the cortex for the fingers specifically involved in 
string manipulation (i.e., the left digits), but not for the thumb 
(which is not used) (Power and Schlaggar, 2017).
Until recently, brain plasticity was viewed as being particular 
prominent for brief critical periods or “windows of opportunity” 
early in life. The long-held view of critical windows has been 
challenged by recent advances in understanding brain development, 
which has revealed that brain plasticity occurs throughout the 
lifespan. This “new” understanding has led to great interest in 
potential interventions that could reverse age-related decrements 
in cognitive functioning (Power and Schlaggar, 2017).
There is potential to exploit inherent neuroplasticity for those 
interested in brain training, such as sport practitioners and 
psychologists working with adults who may wish to change 
dysfunctional movement patterns (e.g., an errant golf swing or 
basketball shooting technique). Could a deep, stable attractor (i.e., 
pattern) be linked to mechanisms of brain plasticity and to the 
closing off of critical periods? Changing action when a movement 
pattern is well established is notoriously difficult and perhaps 
relates to the idea of the closing off of critical periods which may 
involve the physical stabilization of synapses and network 
structure by myelin (a fatty substance wrapped around the axons 
of neuron, providing insulation and increasing the speed of neural 
conduction). Given the formation of new neural connections is 
metabolically costly (Lindenberger et al., 2017), closing off critical 
periods would make sense. A potentially useful strategy may be to 
exploit established attractors such as walking patterns (for different 
forms of bipedal locomotion) or well-learned implement swinging 
actions to explore other object-striking tasks. Perturbing a stable 
attractor could be viewed of sufficient importance and have some 
evolutionary (in performance terms) value. Consider, for example, 
the challenge of neural reorganization after a stroke, when 
previously functional behaviors can become dysfunctional, the 
brain undergoes a dynamic process of reorganization and repair 
and behavior remodeling shaped by new experiences (Jones, 
2017). Motor impairments invite adaptations for motor system 
with different characteristics, a process considered as “skill 
re-acquisition.” When previous ways of performing an action no 
longer work (due to impairment, conditions, or chronic injury), 
the process of adaptation involves skill refinement (including 
perception, action, and cognition), which is practice dependent. 
It quickly becomes apparent that there is no typical way of 
performing an action because of the personal constraints that 
each individual needs to satisfy during movement performance. 
For this reason, rehabilitation programmes need to focus on 
functionality, defined as successful task completion by each 
individual, depending on the uniqueness of his/her personal 
constraints (e.g., intact limbs, muscle wastage or damage, 
degradation of the nervous system through conditions like 
peripheral neuropathy, level of perceptual or cognitive 
impairment). Nervous system regenerative processes occur over 
long time spans (months or longer) but are particularly dynamic 
early (days to weeks) after a stroke (Jones, 2017), providing a 
critical window for skill reacquisition. It would appear that 
neurobiological reorganization mirrors early learning experiences 
with initial overproduction followed by pruning. There is a 
possibility that research findings on neural reorganization in 
stroke patients may have potential implications for practitioners 
who wish to change perception-action skills in unimpaired 
participants. Just like in a stroke, a breakdown in performance as 
a result of a disruption to existing functional patterns or 
connections within the CNS demands system reorganization in 
an attempt to develop functional behavior solutions to achieve 
desired outcomes (Alexandrov et  al., 1993; Järvilehto, 2001). 
However, these experiences may compete with one another in 
shaping neural reorganization patterns, as in learning a novel task 
in unimpaired individuals (see Jones, 2017). The interaction 
between cognitions, perceptions, and actions to regain functionality 
is highlighted in these cases as system reorganization or skill 
reacquisition.
The previous sections have highlighted the limitations of current 
methodologies and mechanisms purported to support effects of 
P-C training on behavior change and refinement. Throughout, it 
is clear that a single focus on developing cognitive skills and 
knowledge situated inside the heads of individuals has led to 
interventions that are failing to achieve their goals, i.e., transfer of 
learned P-C skills is weak. There is a need for research and practice 
to be underpinned by a theoretical model that sets processes of 
cognition, perception, and action in an embodied world. Here, 
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we  propose that the transactional meta-theory of ecological 
dynamics is a candidate framework, emphasizing the continuous 
emerging relations between each individual and the environment 
during behavior, which can meet this requirement.
AN ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS APPROACH 
TO EVALUATING RELATIVE MERITS OF 
PROCESS TRAINING PROGRAMS
Ecological dynamics can help in guiding researchers in gaining a 
deeper understanding of merits of perceptual-cognitive training, 
including “brain training” (Davids and Araújo, 2016). Ecological 
dynamics elucidates understanding of how perception, action, and 
cognition emerge from interacting constraints of performer, task, 
and environment (not solely from the individual, nor from 
component parts, like the brain). It focuses on the role of adaptive 
variability in skilled individuals perceiving affordances in 
performance environments (Araújo et al., 2017). For example, How 
is useful information revealed as such for an individual performing 
a given task? How can relevant contextual information 
be distinguished from irrelevant information, before the detected 
information is “transmitted” to the brain, as proposed in theories 
emphasizing the role of perceptual-cognitive processes? This is 
an  important question because explanations of brain training 
effects rely, traditionally, on assumptions that the brain processes 
(detects, attends to, learns, or memorizes) “relevant” information. 
Information from a sport context will then “feed” neural networks, 
allowing brain structures to organize (programme) a motor 
response. But, how are “brain training” games designed to 
distinguish distracting informational sources in competition from 
those which are simply raising alertness for each individual?
From a neurocomputational view, the putative role of the brain 
is to attribute meaning to stimuli, process internal representations, 
and select an already programmed response. The problem is that the 
starting point is missing in a brain-centered explanatory framework: 
How is an action that helps the body to search for relevant information 
“programmed by the brain”? A process-oriented, representational 
explanation to this question requires a “loan on intelligence” 
(Dennett, 1991). One possible answer to such a challenging question 
implies a clear understanding of the role of constraints and task 
information in explaining how intertwined processes of perception, 
cognition, and action channel goal achievement in athletes (Araújo 
et al., 2017). And, this explanation cannot be confined to how task 
constraints and information are represented in the brain, because 
this will always postpone the answer to the question (require a loan 
on intelligence) concerning how these task constraints and 
information sources were selected in the first place.
An ecological dynamics framework that formally includes both 
the individual (body and brain) and the environment (task 
constraints) does not centralize the brain and its training as the sole 
explanation for expert performance, as implied in “brain training” 
claims. The view that visual information from monitors is sufficient 
to train the brain is too restricted from an ecological dynamics 
viewpoint. This advocates that there are more constraints than eye 
movements, brain waves, and button pressing in explaining and 
training for expert performance in sports (Davids et al., 2015). This 
is one reason why it may be timely for perceptual-cognitive training 
in general, and brain training research in particular, to focus on the 
role of interacting constraints. An interacting constraints model 
can be used to theoretically inform experiments and practice on 
behaviors and brain function. To explain that an expert performer 
is already “in the right place at the right time” and “reads the game 
well,” an ecological dynamics perspective can address how the brain 
needs to be  understood beyond an “organismically biased” 
perspective (Davids and Araújo, 2010b). The separation of organism 
and environment leads to theorizing in which the most significant 
explanatory factors in behavior are located within the organism. 
The upshot is that causes for behavioral disturbances are equated 
with perturbations in brain function (e.g., Yarrow et al., 2009). This 
reductionist explanation of sport performance, as solely dependent 
on “brain” processes, seems to endorse psychological attributes 
(representations, programmes, schemas, scripts) as specific 
anatomical substrates, rather than emerging from continuous 
interactions of the individual-environment system. Analysis of a 
“brain-centered” perspective reveals a belief that the brain perceives, 
executes, conceives, represents, and constructs an action and not 
the organism-environment system. For this reason, some 
neuroscientists have argued that sport performance represents a 
valuable natural context for their research to address (Walsh, 2014). 
However, it is the whole individual, rather than separate anatomical 
parts of his/her body, who perceives and acts during dynamical 
interactions with sport environments (Araújo and Kirlik, 2008). 
Performance is not possessed by the brain of the performer, but 
rather it can be captured as a dynamically varying relationship that 
has emerged between the constraints imposed by the environment 
and the capabilities of a performer (Araújo and Davids, 2011).
From an ecological dynamics perspective, current research on 
brain training and neurofeedback raises questions such as: How 
does a given value of quiet eye relate to emergent coordination 
tendencies of an individual athlete as he or she attempts to satisfy 
changing task constraints? How do skilled performers adapt and 
vary brain wave parameters during performance to support 
coordination of their actions with important environmental events, 
objects, surfaces, and significant others? Rather than looking for 
optimal values of brain waves or quiet eye, it would be  more 
important to look for “critical threshold bandwidths” which could 
be  functionally distinctive according to task and individual 
constraints, within and between expertise levels, while studying 
emergent actions in sport performance (Davids and Araújo, 2016).
From an ecological dynamics approach, behavior can 
be understood as self-organized, in contrast to organization being 
imposed from inside (e.g., the brain) or outside (e.g., the instructions 
of a videogame). Performance is not prescribed by internal or external 
structures, yet within existing constraints, there are typically a limited 
number of stable solutions that can achieve a desired outcome (Araújo 
et al., 2017). From an athlete’s point of view, the task is to exploit 
physical (e.g., rule-determined playing area characteristics) and 
informational (e.g., movements of other players) constraints to 
stabilize performance behaviors. Constraints have the effect of 
reducing the number of configurations available to an athlete at any 
instance, signifying that, in a performance environment, behavior 
patterns emerge under constraints as less functional states of 
organization are dissipated. Athletes can exploit this tendency to 
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enhance their adaptability and even to maintain performance stability 
under perturbations from the environment. Importantly, changes in 
performance constraints can lead a system towards bifurcation points 
where choices emerge as more specific task information becomes 
available, constraining the environment-athlete system to switch to 
a more functional path of behavior (Araújo et al., 2006). Of significance 
for this discussion, neuroplastic changes induced by sport practice 
are more long-lasting when practice is self-motivated rather than 
forced by a decontextualized imposed task (Farmer et al., 2004).
In ecological dynamics, all parts of the system (brain, body, and 
environment) are dynamically integrated during action regulation 
(see also Moreau and Conway, 2014, Moreau et al., 2015). As a 
starting point, the concepts of affordances, self-organization, and 
emergent behaviors make it likely to expect that there may 
be  functional variability in brain functioning characteristics 
(within critical bandwidths) among athletes as they perceive 
affordances under different task constraints. Seeking optimal values 
of brain processes, due to training with digital devices, is rather 
limited to more general effects with currently unknown transfer 
effects to performance environments.
CONCLUSIONS
Elite sports organizations often spend significant time and money 
on off-field activities designed to build knowledge and train 
processes to give them the extra “one percent” and a “crucial edge” 
on their rivals. How effective and efficient is the use of valuable 
resources on process training activities in elite sport? Do these 
process training programmes work and, if so, how can we make 
them even better?
In this paper, we argued that the term “process training” captures 
activities and methodologies, which are predicated on assumptions 
that perceptual and cognitive systems and brain processes can 
be  trained in isolation from the informational constraints of 
competitive performance environments. For this reason, process 
training, in general, can be critically evaluated for its effectiveness 
and efficient use of time and money in achieving performance 
outcomes. Current research suggests that process training has little 
evidence to support effectiveness and efficiency with respect to 
performance behaviors (e.g., see Harris et al., 2018).
Compelling evidence exists that the dominant process training 
methodologies tend to be operationally defined on the basis of an 
assumption of modularized subsystems and lack a clear theoretical 
rationale to underpin their effective implementation in elite training 
programs. These suggestions are in line with arguments of Simons 
et al. (2016, p. 161), when discussing the value of brain training. 
They suggested that “in order to provide effective guidance…we 
need assessments of the effectiveness of the training itself, but 
we  also need studies assessing the comparative effectiveness of 
interventions that do work. Moreover, we need to consider the 
opportunity costs [including time demands] and the generalizability 
of those interventions. At present, none of those further analyses 
are possible given the published literature.” They further added 
that “cognitive-intervention research needs more complete 
translational theories that meaningfully connect lab based measures 
to objective measures of everyday performance (p. 161)”.
In this position paper, we considered theory and evidence to 
determine the effectiveness of current indirect methods of 
developing the underlying neuropsychological mechanisms of 
sports expertise. We  highlighted the focus of P-C training on 
modular cognitive and perceptual structures in the majority of 
studies, discussing insights on limitations of P-C training. In line 
with ideas of Broadbent et al. (2015), we concluded that the current 
evidence that P-C training methods leads to effective transfer to 
performance is limited and requires more work. A key proposal 
here is that any P-C training programme claimed to have a positive 
impact on performance must be  representative of performance 
environments, resulting in fidelity of response actions (Travassos 
et al., 2013). Current P-C training is hamstrung by the decision of 
sport psychologists to underpin interventions with traditional 
cognitive and experimental psychological process-oriented 
perspectives. This theoretical rationale leads to a biased modularized 
focus on the organism and a glaring neglect of environmental 
constraints on behavior (Araújo and Davids, 2011). The biased 
emphasis on acquisition of enriched internal representations 
typically fails to acknowledge (and embrace) the dynamic 
interdependence of knowledge, emotions, and intentions at the 
heart of mutually constraining perception-action couplings that 
underpin performance. A problem is the advocacy of key concepts 
and ideas of formal discipline theory where psychological process 
modules are trained (like muscles) in isolation before being applied 
in practice. We discussed the relatively weak empirical evidence 
that supports this approach. We exemplified this lack of empirical 
support by focusing on part-whole learning in the context of 
Schmidt’s (1975) schema theory and Thorndike’s (1922) identical 
elements theory and contemporary iterations such as Anderson’s 
(1982) ACT theory. We  concluded that there are limitations in 
production models for explaining transfer, for example, by 
highlighting that performance enhancement should not 
be mistaken for transfer (Moreau and Conway, 2014). The latter 
may only be demonstrated when significant improvement in one 
task (sport) can be shown to be a function of practice in some other 
task (brain training task), which is currently lacking in evidence.
The putative mechanisms underpinning P-C training requires 
researchers to evaluate evidence of neuroplasticity and brain 
development. In this respect, it is important to note how current 
thinking has moved away from critical periods or windows of 
opportunity to develop P-C skills to a more lifelong view of 
neuroplasticity. Overall, the neuroscience evidence in support 
of P-C training is harmonious with experimental findings from 
P-C studies showing that functional neural connectivity is 
specific to the experiences undertaken. The result is that changes 
in the brain exhibit “dramatic, larger scale changes in organization 
in response to experience” (Power and Schlaggar, 2017).
So how can current research help us enhance P-C training 
programmes? Here, we  proposed that adopting an ecological 
dynamics perspective may help researchers to frame interventions 
to enhance understanding of continuous, complex interactions 
between individual and team P-C skills from a brain-body-
environment relationship (Gibson, 1979; Chemero, 2003; 
Kiverstein and Miller, 2015). Central to this approach is a focus 
on ensuring that individual-environment mutuality sits at the heart 
of any intervention design. Sampling of the environment (e.g., 
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Brunswik, 1956; Pinder et al., 2011a), when designing interventions 
to enhance P-C skills, has been largely neglected. Consequently, 
it has yet to be established if or how perceptual mechanisms such 
as QE can inform the design of practice environments for the 
purpose of skill development. Ecological dynamics and its 
emphasis on the integrative, inter-connected relationship between 
cognitions, emotions, intentions, and emergent perception-action 
couplings posit a complementary role for indirect and direct 
methods of learning P-C skills. Adopting such integrative 
approaches moves the field beyond the unhelpful cognitive versus 
ecological debate and takes an embodied view of cognition 
allowing researchers and practitioners to begin to design-in factors 
such as context specific knowledge and their link to intentions, 
perceptions, and actions.
In summary, we have attempted to draw on theoretical insights 
that can better articulate cognition, perception, and action as 
it  relates to the dynamic performance environment inhabited 
by  experts, rather than the stale and contrived research “tests” 
performed in computers in laboratories. There are clear 
epistemological and methodological conflicts here that require a 
reimagined breadth of methodology for P-C training to be utilized 
beyond the pages of academic journals. Research methodologies 
must cater for the ambiguity of multiple acting constraints upon 
the performance environment. A research approach grounded in 
the theory of ED has the potential to provide a powerful theoretical 
rationale for how to develop P-C and brain processes in expert 
performers by designing dynamic training tasks which call for 
intertwined cognition, perception, and actions. This focus will 
ensure that performers can develop adaptive variability 
demonstrated by skilled individuals when perceiving affordances 
in performance environments (Araújo et al., 2017). Accordingly, 
P-C training should be understood as a process by which athletes 
become attuned to action-specifying sources of information. 
Future studies in P-C training need to be grounded in a theoretical 
model whose methodologies support tasks with representative 
design, furthering the coupling of perceptual attunement and skill 
acquisition.
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